Not really.
ME / PSP was created to do a legitimate activity, but the creators have a difficult time understanding that it's not actually possible to assure the security of such a secure enclave.
Simply because a thing *can* be used maluciously does not mean it was created with malice in mind.
If you are a government spook where the theoretical attack surface is an unreasonable risk, Intel and AMD both sell special processors that dont have the secure enclave. You dont have to be a spook to buy them either, you just need to know the SKU for them, and be willing to pay extra.
The real problem comes from software makers believing certain things can guarantee a revinue stream through artificial shaping of public consumption habits. Usually through artificial barriers to entry. This is ancillary to the existence or proper use of things like ME / PSP. The correct place to address this is through angry letters to congressmen, or through the voting booth, depending. Not complaints on sites without a real means to affect such public protections.
My quip was that malicious misuse of the ME / PSP can be overtly intercepted, and control asserted, by the system's primary user using an efi shim, which loads first in the boot process. Once the user owns it, the program in the enclave can actively resist further intrusion.
In other words, it's a back door you can install a bouncer in.
Even if you suspect the enclave is doing silliness, it's not magical. In order to exfiltrate data it needs to know things about your network, which it cannot easily find out without being told, and even then, is at the mercy of the router doing its job. In other words, configuring the router to blackhole something, will still blackhole something.
Is it *annoying* that Intel and AMD still want to play makebelieve about the security of the ME / PSP? Yes.
Is it the end of the world that it's there and could be abused?
No. If anything, the Secure Enclave is very useful if you are able to take ownership of it.
(More accurately: there are projects that can nuke most functionality of the ME, like me_cleaner, and some uefi firmwares allow disabling of the ME, such as Coreboot. For circumstances where that's not desirable, it's possible to put the system into 'High Assurance Platform' (HAP) mode with a software exploit, which can be done with an EFI shim. In HAP mode, most of the ME is shut off. Recently, some hacking groups have demonstrated persistent code exploits that can live in the ME. The same exploits attackers use rapidly become useful tools to gain access by whitehat security people, to act like said 'bouncer'. )